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I. INTRODUCTION 
  In Capistrant v. Lifetouch National School Studios, Inc.,1 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted section 229 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts (“Restatement Section 229”) to resolve an 
employment contract conflict that was contrary to Minnesota’s reluctance to 
enforce forfeitures.2 In its niche opinion, the majority credits Minnesota’s 
disfavor of forfeitures but refuses to resolve the contractual dispute as a 
matter of law.3 While the Capistrant matter remains unresolved on remand, 
the court’s decision to integrate Restatement Section 229 creates a 
precedentially consistent avenue for employees to recover relief from 
former corporate employers. 
 This Paper begins by detailing Minnesota’s historical 
interpretation of contracts, conditions precedent, and aversion to 
forfeitures—all of which paved the way for implementing Restatement 
Section 229.4 The facts and procedural posture of Capistrant follow.5 The 
analysis argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court could have affirmed the 
appellate court’s decision in favor of Capistrant, viewed in combination with 
the facts on the record and Minnesota’s precedential reluctance toward 
forfeitures.6 Nevertheless, the analysis proffers that the adopted Restatement 
creates an avenue for corporate employees to recover appropriate remedies 
in future forfeiture actions.7 Thus, this Paper concedes that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court ultimately ruled correctly in Capistrant, despite the lack of 
a sound resolution at law because Capistrant, and those similarly situated, 
will recover under the newly implemented standard.8 
                                                           
ǂ Madalyn Elmquist, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The 
author is a second-year law student working for the Dakota County Attorney’s Office in the 
Adult Prosecution Division. The author previously worked for Birkholz & Associates, LLC 
who affirmed and directed her career in the legal field. Special thanks to Mitchell Hamline 
Law Review for the invaluable edits herein and countless others for their support along the 
way—particularly, these strong and independent women: Lori Horst, Jaclyn Elmquist, Laura 
Sonday, Sara Burger-Edwards, Sabrina Batalden, and Madison Barber. 
1 916 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. 2018). 
2 Id. at 28, 31. 
3 Id. at 24. 
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 See infra Part IV. 
7 See infra Part IV. 
8 See infra Part V. 
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II. HISTORY 
A. Contracts Generally Defined 
A contract is generally defined as “a promise or set of promises for 
the breach of which the law gives a remedy or the performance of which the 
law recognizes as a duty.”9 While contracts are comprised of promises, 
promises are legally enforceable only if there is a legal duty to perform.10 
Consequently, a contract—a legally enforceable promise—is formed when 
“two or more parties exchange bargained-for promises, manifest mutual 
assent to the exchange, and support their promises with consideration.”11 
In turn, a party prevails in a breach of contract action upon proving 
three elements: “(1) formation of a contract; (2) performance by plaintiff of 
any conditions precedent to his right to demand performance by the 
defendant; and (3) breach of the contract by defendant.”12 Notably, some 
Minnesota federal courts include damages as an element of a breach of 
contract claim,13 such that “[a] successful breach-of-contract claim under 
Minnesota law [requires]: ‘(1) formation of a contract; (2) performance by 
plaintiff of any conditions precedent; (3) a material breach of the contract 
by defendant; and (4) damages.’”14 
B. Conditions Precedent 
The second element in a breach of contract action—a plaintiff’s 
failure to fulfill conditions precedent—is at issue in Capistrant.15 Per the 
                                                           
9 Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 258 Minn. 533, 537, 104 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1960) 
(summarizing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1932)). 
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
11 Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall, 857 N.W.2d 695, 701 
(Minn. 2014) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. L. INST. 1981)); 
see Thomas B. Olson & Assoc., P.A. v. Leffert, Jay & Polglaze, P.A., 756 N.W.2d 907, 918 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (“The formation of a contract requires communication of a specific 
and definite offer, acceptance, and consideration.”) (quoting Com. Assocs., v. Work 
Connection, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 772, 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Pine River State Bank 
v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn. 1983)). 
12 Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis added) 
(citing Briggs Transp. Co. v. Ranzenberger, 299 Minn. 127, 129, 217 N.W.2d 198, 200 
(1974)) (“These elements of the cause of action are the fundamental propositions which 
plaintiff must prove in order to establish a right of recovery.”). 
13 See, e.g., Hot Stuff Foods, LLC v. Dornbach, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1042 (D. Minn. 2010) 
(citing MSK EyEs Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 546 F.3d 533, 540 (8th Cir. 2008)). 
14 Gen. Mills Operations, LLC v. Five Star Custom Foods, Ltd., 703 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th 
Cir. 2013) (quoting Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 951, 961 (D. Minn. 
2000), aff’d, 286 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
15 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 24 (Minn. 2018); see Park 
Nicollet Clinic, 808 N.W.2d at 833. 
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Restatement, “[a] condition is an event, not certain to occur, which must 
occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a 
contract becomes due.”16 At common law, conditions are related to either: 
(1) “the existence of a contract” or (2) “the duty of immediate performance 
under [the contract].”17 These common-law conditions are known 
respectively as “conditions precedent to the formation of [a] contract” or 
“conditions precedent to performance under an existing contract.”18 The 
former involves issues related to the offer and acceptance, precluding any 
determinative contract formation.19 The latter recognizes a binding contract 
but excuses a party’s duty to perform until the contracting party adheres to 
the condition precedent.20 Thus, failure to perform constitutes a breach if 
the contracting party fulfilled the requisite condition precedent in 
anticipation of performance.21 
Common law indicates most conditions are conditions precedent 
to performance under an existing contract,22 which Minnesota case law 
similarly reflects. For instance, conditions precedent are historically 
attributed to insurance policies.23 Within this context, a condition precedent 
is an event that needs to occur—some act that the insured needs to do after 
the parties agree on contractual terms—before the insurance contract 
becomes binding.24 Thus, if the condition precedent is not met (e.g., 
notifying an insurance company about damages in the requisite amount of 
time) and the insurer does not waive the non-occurrence, the insured’s 
policy rights do not vest.25 
In 1986, Minnesota adopted this concept when Justice Marshall 
coined Minnesota’s operative definition of condition precedent: 
                                                           
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
17 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 38:4 (4th ed. Nov. 2020). 
18 20 BRENT A. OLSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: MINNESOTA BUSINESS LAW 
DESKBOOK, FORMATION AND OPERATION OF BUSINESSES § 7:110(b) (Nov. 2019) (emphasis 
added). 
19 See id. (referencing M. K. Metals, Inc. v. Container Recovery Corp., 645 F.2d 583, 587–
89 (8th Cir. 1981)). 
20 See City of Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999); 
see also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 628 (1960 & Supp. 1999); 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§ 666A (3d ed. 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
21 See 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 17. 
22 Id. 
23 See 14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 41:2 (4th ed. 2020) (noting the commonality of 
conditions precedent and subsequent being associated with insurance policies); see also, e.g., 
Price v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 497, 504, 1871 WL 3288, at *6 (July 1871) 
(holding that a warranty within a life insurance policy is a condition precedent that must be 
strictly complied with), overruled in part by Chambers v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 64 Minn. 
495, 498, 67 N.W. 367, 368 (1896) (holding that insurers have the burden to allege, plead, 
and prove all warranties relevant to a case to avoid the insurance policy vesting). 
24 Chambers, 64 Minn. at 497, 67 N.W. at 368. 
25 Id. 
4
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A condition precedent, as known in the law, is one which 
is to be performed before the agreement of the parties 
becomes operative. A condition precedent calls for the 
performance of some act or the happening of some event 
after the contract is entered into, and upon the 
performance or happening of which its obligation is made 
to depend. 26 
Thereafter, the Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
proceeded to define and uphold conditions precedent, most notably in tax,27 
insurance,28 and commercial law matters.29 
C. Disproportionate Forfeiture 
If a condition precedent is not satisfied, a forfeiture may result if it 
is reasonable.30 A forfeiture is the denial of compensation—specifically, a 
promisee’s lost right to the agreed exchange—after the promisee relied 
substantially on that exchange.31 
In 1962, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that forfeitures are not 
favored in law or equity.32 Thus, Minnesota courts simultaneously decided 
that construction against forfeitures must be adopted when reasonably 
possible.33 Meaning, unless the parties intended or the contract stated 
otherwise, a contract must be construed to avoid forfeiture.34 
The Minnesota Supreme Court gradually developed stricter 
guidelines prohibiting disproportionate forfeitures, particularly when 
obligors who drafted the agreements were the ones seeking forfeitures.35 
Nevertheless, when a condition precedent constitutes an accident or 
mistake, equity relieves the individual when the delay is slight, the loss is 
                                                           
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Crossroads Church v. Cnty. of Dakota, 800 N.W.2d 608, 617 (Minn. 2011) 
(construing a statutory deadline as a condition precedent in a property tax matter because 
the notice was material to permit re-zoning). 
28 See, e.g., Nat’l City Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 447 N.W.2d 171, 178 (Minn. 
1989) (enforcing a banker’s blanket bond as a condition precedent in an insurance matter 
because it was a material contract term). 
29 See, e.g., Minnwest Bank Cent. v. Flagship Props. LLC, 689 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2004) (excusing the lender from performance because the borrower failed to obtain a 
Small Business Administration loan, which was a condition precedent to the long-term 
financing agreement). 
30 Crossroads Church, 800 N.W.2d at 616 (explaining that several oral contract conditions 
precedent were not met, which were material to the contract, making forfeiture reasonable 
under the circumstances). 
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
32 Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 263 Minn. 135, 147, 116 N.W.2d 91, 100 (1962). 
33 Id. (noting the applicable rule set forth under 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 320). 
34 Id. 
35 Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1979). 
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small, and not granting relief results in an unconscionable hardship.36 
Similarly, courts do not enforce forfeiture when the contract adequately 
protects the obligor by other means.37 To further protect the obligee, the 
party wishing to enforce forfeiture “carries a heavy burden of establishing 
his right thereto by clear and unmistakable proof.”38 While no formal rule 
was adopted until the Capistrant decision, Minnesota’s general aversion to 
forfeitures remains consistent.39 
D. The Bennett Test 
The Capistrant decision involved both contract law and 
employment law,40 warranting an overview of Minnesota’s enforcement and 
drafting considerations for restrictive covenants, primarily post-employment 
covenants not to compete.41 Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co. is 
Minnesota’s landmark case for determining the validity of noncompete 
clauses within employment contracts. 42 
William Bennett, a former and mediocre night-time radio 
personality, signed an employment contract containing an eighteen-month 
noncompete provision that prohibited him from obtaining related 
employment within a thirty-five-mile radius of Storz Broadcasting 
Company.43 Ultimately, the court held that this noncompete clause was 
unreasonable.44 The court ruled as such because the provision was broader 
than necessary to protect the former employer’s legitimate interests,45 and 
                                                           
36 Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1979) (excusing the non-
occurrence of a condition precedent in a real estate matter because of its unconscionable 
result on the tenant). 
37 See, e.g., Hideaway, Inc. v. Gambit Inv. Inc., 386 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 
(acknowledging that Respondent was adequately protected by receiving $500 when Appellant 
breached). 
38 United Carbon Co. v. Monroe, 92 F. Supp. 460, 465 (W.D. La. 1950), aff’d, 196 F.2d 455 
(5th Cir. 1952) (crafting the standard of proof for forfeiture actions: clear and unmistakable 
proof). 
39 See Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Minn. 2018). 
40 Id. As will be noted in Part IV.B, Capistrant involves an “immediate” return-of-property 
clause intermixed with an employment noncompete clauses—both of which forfeit 
Capistrant’s retirement benefits. See id. at 30–31. 
41 See Ryan E. Mick & JoLynn Markison, Non-Compete Laws: Minnesota, PRAC. L. STATE 
Q&A (May 15, 2020). 
42 Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965). 
43 Id. at 894. 
44 Id. at 899–900. 
45 Id. at 898 (“One is privileged purposely to cause another not to perform a contract . . . with 
a third person by in good faith asserting or threatening to protect properly a legally protected 
interest of his own which he believes may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the 
performance of the contract . . . .”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 773 (AM. L. 
INST. 1939) to define an employer’s legitimate interest at stake in an employment contract)). 
6
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because the plaintiff would be forced to accept a substantial salary decrease 
or move to another community to find work that did not violate the 
noncompete agreement.46 
Consequently, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Bennett 
test to resolve similar noncompete disputes.47  
The test applied is whether or not the restraint is necessary 
for the protection of the business or good will of the 
employer, and if so, whether the stipulation has imposed 
upon the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably 
necessary to protect the employer’s business, regard being 
had to the nature and character of the employment, the 
time for which the restriction is imposed, and the territorial 
extent of the locality to which the prohibition extends.48 
 In other words, the Bennett test enforces a noncompete 
agreement when “the restraint is necessary for the protection of the business 
or good will of the employer” and the agreement does not impose “greater 
restraint [on the employee] than is reasonably necessary to protect the 
employer’s business.”49 This test also considers: (a) the nature and character 
of the employment; (b) the duration of the noncompete; and (c) the 
geographical scope of the noncompete.50 Ultimately, if the employer’s 
interests predominate over the employee’s interests, the noncompete 
agreement is valid and enforceable.51 
While cases such as Pathfinder Communications Corp. v. Macy52 
and Walker Employment Services, Inc. v. Pankhurst53 distinguished 
                                                           
46 Id. at 898. The Court held that the effect of the noncompete clause created a restraint on 
trade, because it limited Bennett’s right to work and earn a living. Id. Because this 
employment contract placed a restraint on trade, it was “[c]autiously considered, carefully 
scrutinized, looked upon with disfavor, strictly interpreted and [not] reluctantly upheld” 
(citing and adopting the rule established in Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. 
Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ohio 1952)). 
47 See generally Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1980); 
Alside, Inc. v. Larson, 300 Minn. 285, 294, 220 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1974). 
48 Bennett, 270 Minn. 525 at 534, 134 N.W.2d at 899. 
49 See Mick & Markison, supra note 41, at 2–3 (summarizing Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 899). 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 795 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Macy mistakenly relied on Bennett because the 
matter at bar was not factually similar to Bennett. Id. at 1112 n.5. In Bennett, the radio-host 
was mediocre at best, while Macy was utilizing Pathfinder resources to increase Macy’s name 
recognition and marketability, creating a legitimate protectable interest. Id. 
53 300 Minn. 264, 219 N.W.2d 437 (1974). This case distinguishes Bennett in the following 
ways: (1) Pankhurst had access to his employer’s clients and his employer’s secrets; (2) the 
restrictive covenant was not unduly restrictive, because it only applied for one year following 
employment and to Hennepin County; (3) there was no unreasonable restraint regarding 
time or area; and (4) Parkhurst was not forced out or demoted to an inferior position. Id. at 
441–42. 
7
Elmquist: Not Pictured: Minnesota’s Disfavor Toward Forfeitures—Capistrant
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
822 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
Bennett, the Bennett test remained relatively consistent, even in recent 
years.54 That said, Wells Fargo Insurance Services USA v. King recently 
expanded its application.55 Wells Fargo Insurance sued King for breaching 
a noncompete clause after Wells Fargo Insurance merged with King’s prior 
employer.56 A Minnesota District Court applied the Bennett test and 
determined the employer’s subjective intent to enforce a restrictive covenant 
may affect a court’s willingness to enforce it.57 However, the court did not 
interpret Bennett to mean that under Minnesota law, the enforceability of a 
noncompete clause turns on the employer’s subjective motivation.58  
The Bennett test’s most recent application is outlined in Lapidus v. 
Lurie LLP.59 Lapidus was an administrative partner at Lurie, responsible for 
managing Lurie’s business and affairs, supporting Lurie’s partners, and 
administering Lurie’s relationships with its legal counsel, banks, health 
insurance carriers, and professional liability insurance carriers.60 However, 
upon retiring, Lapidus began providing services to a competing business, 
violating the noncompete clause in his Lurie employment contract.61 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that Lapidus’s 
former employment, combined with his tenure as a partner, demonstrated 
his direct access and knowledge to the confidential information that Lurie 
had a legitimate business interest in protecting.62 Thus, the three 
noncompete provisions served Lurie’s legitimate interest in protecting its 
confidential information, satisfying the first prong of the Bennett test.63 
                                                           
54 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Bionics Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 456 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001) (extending Bennett). The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that 
“restrictive covenants are enforced to the extent reasonably necessary to protect legitimate 
business interests. Legitimate interests that may be protected include the company's good 
will, trade secrets, and confidential information.” Id. (citations omitted). 
55 No. 15-CV-4378, 2016 WL 6892108, at *1 (D. Minn. July 29, 2016). 
56 Id. at *5. 
57 Id. at *7. 
58 Id. 
59 No. A17-1656, 2018 WL 3014698 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018). 
60 Id. at *6. 
61 Id. at *3. Lapidus violated three provisions under the noncompete clause. Id. First, 17.1(a) 
prohibited Lapidus from rendering any services to clients who were served during the 
partnership two years immediately prior to withdrawal or retirement. Id. at *1. Next, 17.1(b) 
prohibited Lapidus from providing services within fifty miles of the office. Id. at *2. Finally, 
17.3(e) forfeited any post-retirement payments if Lapidus provided services to former clients 
within ten years following withdrawal or retirement. Id. at *2. 
62 Id. at *7. 
63 See id. at *6 (“The protection of confidential information is a legitimate business interest 
where the former employee had access to or knowledge of ‘information not readily 
ascertainable by . . . competitors’ and intended to be kept ‘in house.’”) (quoting and applying 
the rule set forth in Roth v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1029, 1030 (D. Minn. 
1982)). 
8
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Next, the appellate court affirmed the noncompete provisions, as 
both were reasonable in scope and duration because each provision 
protected Lurie’s confidential information and good will.64 First, the two-
year temporal restriction was justified because Lapidus had “conducted 
business in the same area for many years,” building a sizable clientele.65 In 
relation, “‘[s]olicitation by mere reputation and past business practices is 
more than sufficient’” to uphold a time restriction.66 Second, the fifty-mile 
geographic noncompete provision was properly limited in scope and 
duration to protect Lurie’s legitimate business interests because it paralleled 
similar provisions in supporting cases.67 Thus, the appellate court utilized 
the Bennett test to uphold the noncompete clause in Lapidus’s contract.68 
Minnesota courts undertake the same Bennett test principles when 
the violation of noncompete clauses forfeits employee benefits. Harris v. 
Bolin exemplified this; a former employee sued his former employer to 
recover profit sharing plan funds he forfeited because he violated the 
noncompete clause in his employment contract.69 After interpreting the 
vague forfeiture clause,70 the court held that “the forfeiture clause of the 
profit sharing plan and trust agreement constitute[ed] an unlawful restraint 
of trade because it [was] not limited as to time, harm to the employer, or 
geographical area.”71 
Coincidentally, Lapidus v. Lurie used this same analysis to establish 
whether Lapidus forfeited his retirement benefits by violating noncompete 
provision 17.3(e).72 However, unlike the plaintiff in Harris, Lapidus did not 
derive his post-retirement payments from a profit-sharing plan.73 Instead, the 
payments were intended to provide consideration for Lapidus’s continued 
promise not to compete.74 Moreover, the employment contract did not 
                                                           
64 Id. at *8. A two-year noncompete clause is reasonable in the court’s eyes per prior 
precedent. Id. Furthermore, an agreement not to render competitive services for the ten 
years upon which $11 million in post-retirement funds would be distributed constitutes a fair 
exchange for continued loyalty. Id. 
65 Id. at *6. 
66 Id. (quoting Haynes v. Monson, 301 Minn. 327, 330, 224 N.W.2d 482, 484 (1974)). 
67 Id. at *7. The court affirmed the fifty-mile geographic barrier because Minnesota enforced 
a five-year noncompete clause over six states in a factually similar matter. See Roth, 532 F. 
Supp. at 1031–32. 
68 See Lapidus, 2018 WL 3014698, at *2, *9. 
69 310 Minn. 391, 393, 247 N.W.2d 600, 601 (1976). 
70 “[I]f an employee leaves the Company to enter into a competing business, the Trustee, in 
his discretion, may declare all or any part of the employer’s contribution to an employee’s 
account forfeited.” Id. at 601–02 (internal quotes omitted). 
71 Id. at 603. 
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provide Lurie with adequate protection without the forfeiture clause.75 
Lastly, Lapidus did not suffer a “great injustice” because he continued to 
profit at his former employer’s expense.76 
Apart from noncompete clauses, Minnesota recognizes other 
agreements used to protect confidential information and trade secrets.77 
While not expressly recognized, Minnesota courts are likely to uphold non-
disclosure and non-solicitation covenants if they are supported by adequate 
consideration.78 While the analysis regarding these covenants may resemble 
the Bennett test, Minnesota courts may be less strict when deciding whether 
to uphold these alternative agreements because they are traditionally less 
restrictive on trade.79 That said, Minnesota has generally taken a strict stance 
on the inevitable disclosure doctrine pertaining to these covenants and 
noncompete clauses.80 For example, suppose an employer fails to 
demonstrate that breaching the noncompete contract would result in 
irreparable harm to the employer; in that case, the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine cannot satisfy the burden of proof necessary to issue an injunction 
against the former employee.81  
E. Section 229 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
“Restatements of the law are considered persuasive authority only 
and are not binding unless specifically adopted in Minnesota by statute or 
case law.”82 Restatement Section 229, while not adopted in Minnesota prior 
to the Capistrant decision, runs parallel with Minnesota’s historical 
reluctance toward forfeitures.83 It reads: “[t]o the extent that the non-
occurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court 
may excuse the non-occurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was 
a material part of the agreed exchange.”84 Meaning, a court may excuse the 
                                                           
75 Id. Lurie contracted a liquidated-damages provision that protected Lurie’s lost revenue 
resulting from former partner competition. Id. However, the forfeiture provisions were 
crafted to shield Lurie’s post-retirement payment program as a whole, because these 
payments were unfunded and a major part of the company’s current cash flow. Id. 
76 Id. at *9. 
77 See Mick & Markison, supra note 41, at 13. 
78 Id. at 16. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 17. 
81 See St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Carter, 913 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 2018) (citing Menter Co. 
v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 410, 180 N.W. 553, 554–55 (1920) (inferring irreparable harm 
when: (1) customer good will is at stake; (2) an employee takes and intends to benefit from 
business secrets; or (3) the risk of disclosing business secrets could cause irreparable 
damage)). 
82 Williamson v. Guentzel, 584 N.W.2d 20, 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
83 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Minn. 2018). 
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (AM. L. INST. 1981). A forfeiture “refer[s] 
to the denial of compensation that results when the obligee loses his right to the agreed 
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 13
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss2/13
2021] MINNESOTA’S DISFAVOR TOWARD FORFEITURES 825 
non-occurrence of a condition during the period where it should have 
occurred if the occurrence is immaterial to the contract.85 Thereafter, the 
court weighs the extent of the forfeiture against the potential risk and the 
protection lost if the non-occurrence of the condition is excused.86 
In enXco Development Corp. v. Northern States Power Co, the 
court implemented Restatement Section 229.87 The case concerned two 
contracts that functioned together to accomplish a wind-energy-generation 
project known as the Merricourt Project (“Project”).88 The first contract, the 
Developed Wind Project Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”), required 
enXco to obtain the requisite permits to develop the Project site.89 These 
permits included the Certificate of Site Compatibility (“CSC”), which was 
needed before the parties could begin the Project.90 Regardless, all permits 
needed to be satisfied prior to the “Long-Stop Date.”91 In return, Northern 
States Power Company (“NSP”) would purchase the Project’s real estate 
and assets for $15 million.92 This contract also had an express termination 
clause, permitting either party to terminate upon written notice if the 
conditions precedent were not fulfilled before construction began.93 The 
second contract—the Engineering, Procurement, and Construction 
Agreement (“EPCA”)—required NSP to pay enXco over $350 million in 
exchange for constructing and finalizing the Project.94 The purpose of these 
two contracts was to ensure that neither party had an obligation to proceed 
with the EPCA until enXco met the PSA obligations.95  
Once enXco executed the PSA, enXco had approximately twenty-
nine months to obtain the CSC, but two years expired before enXco 
submitted the CSC application.96 “Thus, enXco had less than six months to 
obtain the CSC by the Long-Stop Date,” which it ultimately failed to 
complete.97 However, enXco purchased turbines in preparation for the 
                                                           
exchange after he has relied substantially, as by preparation or performance on the 
expectation of that exchange.” Id. at cmt. b. 
85 See id. at cmt. c. 
86 Id. at cmt. b. 
87 758 F.3d 940, 947 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying Minnesota law). 
88 Id. at 941–42. 
89 Id. at 942. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. “Long-Stop Date” was March 31, 2011. Id. This date served as a milestone to assess 





96 Id. at 942–43. 
97 Id. at 943. This permit process requires a statutorily mandated public hearing, and, in this 
case, that process was initially supposed to take two to four months. Id. However, due to a 
11
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Project, totaling roughly $216 million.98 Thus, enXco sued NSP for 
declaratory relief and damages for breach of contract.99 enXco argued that 
disproportionate forfeiture should apply to prevent strict enforcement of the 
condition precedent; however, the district court granted summary judgment 
in NSP’s favor and enXco appealed.100 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit assumed that Minnesota would apply 
the doctrine of disproportionate forfeiture under Restatement Section 229, 
but it also considered that forfeitures may be appropriate when “consonant 
with notions of fairness and justice under the law.”101 Based on this dual 
standard, the court excused enXco’s forfeiture for two reasons. First, enXco 
“maintained possession and ownership of the Project assets and real estate,” 
intending to profit from the turbines in other projects, while NSP did not 
assume the same.102 Second, both enXco and NSP are sophisticated 
corporate parties who were both represented by counsel during contract 
negotiations.103 As such, the circuit court left both parties to their bargain, 
refusing to apply the doctrine of disproportionate forfeiture.104 
This case narrows the application of Restatement Section 229. 
Now, forfeitures do not result when: (1) the breaching party maintains 
ownership of the assets comprising the contract;105 or (2) sophisticated 
parties are represented by counsel during contract negotiations.106 Overall, 
Minnesota’s precedential disfavor toward forfeiture is encompassed within 
the Restatement and narrowed in relevant part to corporate entities via the 
enXco decision—both of which should have been reflected in Capistrant v. 
Lifetouch National School Studios, Inc.107 
                                                           
snowstorm, the hearing was delayed, and the CSC permit was not granted until June 8, 2011. 
Id. 
98 Id. Notably, enXco redeployed these turbines for use in a different project in Texas. Id. 
99 Id. at 944. 
100 Id. enXco also argued under the doctrine of temporary impracticability but that doctrine 
is not relevant to this Paper. Id. 
101  Id. at 947 (quoting Klipsch, Inc. v. WWR Tech., Inc., 127 F.3d 729, 737 (8th Cir. 1997)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
102 Id. (comparing to Hideaway, Inc. v. Gambit Inv. Inc, 386 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986) (noting that the doctrine applied when the non-breaching party retained “a 
business worth $13,000 after only paying $500”)). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (referencing Klipsch, Inc., 127 F.3d at 737). 
106 Id. (“These sophisticated parties, presumably with the assistance of experienced and able 
counsel, exercised their liberty of contract and now are accountable for the product of their 
negotiations.”) (quoting Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 
118, 125 (Minn. 1991)). 
107 916 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. 2018); see infra Section IV.C. 
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III. THE CAPISTRANT DECISION 
A. The Lifetouch Contract 
On June 30, 1986, John J. Capistrant (“Capistrant”) entered into a 
Territory Manager Employment Agreement (“Agreement”) with his former 
employer, Lifetouch National School Studios, Inc. (“Lifetouch”).108 Section 
III Exhibit B of the Territory Agreement was titled “Residual Commission 
and Payments for Restriction Against Competition.”109 It stated that 
Lifetouch would pay Capistrant residual commission equaling thirty percent 
of Net Sales Receipts in the Territory during the last Fiscal Year in six equal 
annual installments, starting one year after the Territory Agreement 
terminated.110 
In consideration for residual commission payments, Capistrant 
signed the provisions in Section III Paragraph 11: “Restriction Against 
Competition.”111 Under this Paragraph, Capistrant acknowledged that 
disclosing any of Lifetouch’s confidential or proprietary information, trade 
secrets, or other affiliated information would cause insurmountable harm to 
Lifetouch.112 Thus, the Agreement restricted Capistrant from competing 
with Lifetouch during the contract term and for twenty-four months after 
the contract term concluded.113 Two unnumbered paragraphs at the end of 
Paragraph 11 state the following, creating a basis for the forfeiture of 
Capistrant’s Residual Commission: 
In the event that Territory Manager shall violate any of the 
provisions of this section, then Lifetouch shall have the 
right to seek injunctive relief and any other remedy allowed 
to it in law or equity or by this Agreement. 
At the end of the Term, Territory Manager shall 
immediately deliver to Lifetouch all of Lifetouch’s 
property . . . .114 
                                                           
108 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, 
at *1 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016), rev’d, 899 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d, 
916 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. 2018). 
109 Id. at *3. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at *1–2. 
112 Id. at *2. 
113 Id. (summarizing the following prohibitions: (A) disclosing trade secrets; (B) soliciting or 
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B. Facts & Procedural Posture 
On September 29, 2014, Capistrant filed a declaratory judgment 
action to determine the proper calculation of residual commission due 
upon his retirement because the plain language of the contract supported 
that it was worth approximately $2.6 million.115 Three months after 
Capistrant’s retirement, Capistrant informed his attorney that he forwarded 
emails containing Lifetouch’s records to his personal email and 
accumulated eight boxes of Lifetouch’s records in his attic over thirty 
years.116 Capistrant’s attorney promptly informed Lifetouch’s counsel about 
this discovery, and Capistrant distributed the email and documents to 
Lifetouch upon its request.117 Consequently, Lifetouch moved for summary 
judgment, asserting that Capistrant’s failure to satisfy the immediate return-
of-property clause acted as the non-occurrence of a condition precedent, 
excusing Lifetouch’s obligation to pay Capistrant his residual commission.118 
The district court granted Lifetouch’s motion for summary 
judgment.119 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, 
holding that the return-of-property clause read as a whole “function[s] as a 
noncompete agreement with a forfeiture clause.”120 Thus, to avoid 
disproportionate forfeiture, the court applied Restatement Section 229 to 
excuse the non-occurrence of the condition.121 The court held, as a matter 
of law, that the forfeiture was disproportionate because: (1) the immediate 
return of property was immaterial to the contract; (2) Lifetouch’s ability to 
forfeit was not clear and convincing; (3) the delay in returning property 
caused Lifetouch no harm; and (4) the contract adequately protected 
Lifetouch with other provisions.122 
                                                           
115 See Complaint at 1, Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios., Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 
2014 WL 12784904 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Oct. 23, 2014) (filing declaratory judgment action); 
Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios., Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, 
at *7 n.5 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016) (noting plain language issue); Capistrant v. Lifetouch 
Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 844, 852, 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d, 916 
N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 2018) (acknowledging contract’s worth). 
116 Capistrant, 899 N.W.2d at 850. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 850–51. 
119 Capistrant, 2016 WL 3197527, at *5. The court also held no reasonable jury could classify 
Capistrant’s three-month delay in returning Lifetouch’s property as immediate. Id. at *6. 
Additionally, while forfeitures are not favored in Minnesota, the court held that equity could 
not save Capistrant from his contractual obligations. Id. at *7. Finally, Capistrant’s motion 
for summary judgment on alternative unjust enrichment grounds was granted because an 
express contract was found. Id. at *8. 
120 Capistrant, 899 N.W.2d at 854. 
121 Id. at 855. 
122 Id. at 857. The appellate court also held the district court erred “by not considering 
whether the forfeiture clause was a part of an overbroad restrictive covenant to not compete.” 
Id. at 857–58; see Harris v. Bolin, 310 Minn. 391, 395, 247 N.W.2d 600, 603 (1976). The 
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C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
Lifetouch appealed the appellate court’s decision, and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 
on the following grounds.123 First, the court noted that Lifetouch’s immediate 
return-of-property clause was a condition precedent to Lifetouch’s duty to 
pay Capistrant his residual commission.124 Thus, the court reversed the 
appellate court’s finding that the return-of-property clause was immaterial as 
a matter of law because, in general, conditions precedent are always 
material.125  
Still, Lifetouch’s return-of-property clause was distinguishable from 
previous cases in which the court applied this general rule because: (1) the 
contract condition did not become operative until Capistrant’s employment 
terminated twenty-eight years following its commencement, and (2) failure 
to comply with the clause would result in a $2.6 million forfeiture.126 Given 
the unprecedented employment clause and forfeiture at hand, the court 
affirmed the appellate court’s decision to adopt Restatement Section 229.127 
This meant the court’s decision hinged on whether the immediate return-
of-property clause was “material” as defined under Restatement Section 229 
before it could find a basis to reject the disproportionate forfeiture.128 
The court identified multiple conflicting inferences that could 
impact the determination of whether the return-of-property clause was 
material in relation to Capistrant’s right to residual commissions.129 Noting 
that the materiality of the clause would determine if Capistrant would 
receive millions of dollars or walk away from thirty years of employment 
with no retirement funds, the court remanded back to the district court for 
factual findings on materiality.130 Thus, if the district court determines on 
                                                           
court compared the forfeiture of a profit sharing plan and trust agreement because it was 
“not limited as to time, harm to the employer, or geographical area . . . . [And because it was] 
broader than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer.” But see Capistrant 
v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 30 n.5 (Minn. 2018) (explaining that 
the Agreement did not restrict Capistrant’s ability to work elsewhere or for a competitor, 
thereby not satisfying the overbroad principle as established in Harris). 
123 Capistrant, 916 N.W.2d at 23. 
124 Id. at 27. 
125 Id. at 28–29. 
126 Id. at 26–30 (referencing how the condition precedent here does not allow resolution of 
the materiality question as a matter of law, because the provision imposed an unprecedented 
noncompete obligation that continued after Capistrant’s employment ended). 
127 Id. at 28. 
128 Id. at 29. 
129 Id. at 30–31. 
130 Id. at 31. 
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remand that the contract term is immaterial, it will also likely find the 
forfeiture disproportionate, affording Capistrant an appropriate remedy.131 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Minnesota’s precedential reluctance toward forfeitures should have 
afforded Capistrant an appropriate remedy irrespective of section 229 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to uphold its own precedent 
when remanding the appellate court’s decision in the Capistrant matter. As 
demonstrated by decades of case law, the Minnesota Supreme Court looks 
upon forfeitures of all kinds with disfavor,132 indicating that forfeitures are 
contrary to law and equity.133 As such, equity relieves an obligee when there 
has been “excusable and inconsequential tardiness,” particularly when 
forfeiture would cause the obligee significant hardship and eradicate their 
long-term success.134 Thus, in allowing forfeiture of Capistrant’s retirement 
funds, Capistrant is contrary to Minnesota’s standard even though it 
involved a first impression noncompete employment contract.135 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals provided a precedentially 
consistent analysis when finding for Capistrant, and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court should have affirmed summary judgment, irrespective of Restatement 
Section 229. The rule is as follows: if a contract forfeits employee benefits 
by means disproportionate to the company’s harm, the forfeiture cannot be 
upheld.136 A forfeiture is disproportionate under Minnesota case law if: (1) 
there is excusable delay fulfilling the condition precedent because the delay 
does not cause the obligor harm; (2) other provisions in the noncompete 
agreement adequately protect the obligor; (3) the contract’s language does 
                                                           
131 See id. 
132 See, e.g., Harris v. Bolin, 310 Minn. 391, 247 N.W.2d 600, 602 (1976); Hideaway, Inc. v. 
Gambit Investments, Inc. 386 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Warren v. 
Driscoll, 186 Minn. 1, 5, 242 N.W. 346, 347 (1932)). 
133 Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 263 Minn. 135, 147, 116 N.W.2d 91, 100 (1962). 
134 Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645, 647–48 (Minn. 1979) (referencing F. B. 
Fountain Co. v. Stein, 97 Conn. 619, 624, 118 A. 47, 49 (1922)). 
135 Capistrant, 916 N.W.2d at 30 (deciding that the return-of-property clause imposed 
continuous obligations on Capistrant post-employment, preventing the appellate court from 
resolving the materiality question as a matter of law) (distinguishing Crossroads Church v. 
Cnty. of Dakota, 800 N.W.2d 608, 615 (Minn. 2011). But see, e.g., Bellboy Seafood Corp. 
v. Nathanson 410 N.W.2d 349, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). Defendant Nathanson breached 
his noncompete agreement, causing his former employer’s business to lose between twenty-
five percent to thirty-three percent of its business in four weeks. Id. at 351. However, the 
appellate court found for Defendant as the liquidated damages provision amounted to a 
forfeiture of earned income and was unenforceable. Id. at 352. 
136 See Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l School Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
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not provide clear and unmistakable proof of the obligor’s intent to forfeit; 
or (4) an unfulfilled condition precedent is immaterial to the contract.137 
1. Excusable Delay & Harm to Obligor 
The Minnesota Supreme court strikes down forfeitures when the 
failure to timely fulfill a condition precedent would significantly 
disadvantage the obligee but not cause substantial harm to the obligor.138 In 
the Capistrant matter, the post-employment restrictive covenants in the 
noncompete clause protected Lifetouch from harm as follows: 
11. Restrictions Against Competition. Territory Manager 
agrees that during the Term and for twenty-four (24) 
months following the end of the Term, Territory Manager 
shall not: 
A. Disclose any trade secrets and confidential 
information of Lifetouch, including 
Lifetouch’s school and customer lists and 
merchandising techniques, to any person, 
firm, corporation, association or other entity 
for any reason or purpose whatsoever. 
B. Directly or indirectly, either as an individual 
for Territory Manager’s own account, or on 
behalf of another person or persons, 
corporation, partnership or other entity, solicit 
or deal with any school included in Lifetouch’s 
Business whom Territory Manager solicited 
or serviced while in the employ of Lifetouch 
or whom Territory Manager knew to be a 
customer of Lifetouch or any of Lifetouch’s 
affiliates. 
C. Directly or indirectly, either as an individual 
for Territory Manager’s own account, or on 
behalf of another person or persons, 
corporation, partnership or other entity, solicit 
any present or future employee of Lifetouch 
                                                           
137 See id. at 857. 
138 See Trollen, 287 N.W.2d at 648 (“[I]n cases of mere neglect in fulfilling a condition 
precedent . . . which do not fall within accident or mistake, equity will relieve when the delay 
has been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to grant relief would result in such 
hardship . . . as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the condition precedent . . . 
.”). 
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for the purpose of hiring or attempting to hire 
such employee.139 
Notably, Capistrant’s three-month delay in returning Lifetouch’s 
paper records and forwarding Lifetouch emails to a private email address 
did not result in the harm that Lifetouch contractually protected itself 
against.140 Capistrant did not disclose trade secrets, compete with Lifetouch, 
or solicit any present or future Lifetouch employees.141 Instead, the box of 
records accumulated throughout Capistrant’s career collected dust in his 
attic, and the emails he forwarded for safekeeping remained undistributed 
and later deleted.142 The record also lacked evidence that Capistrant 
intended to disseminate Lifetouch’s confidential business records.143 At 
most, Lifetouch’s only damages were from hiring an expert to track 
Capistrant’s email correspondence.144 Even so, in Capistrant’s effort to 
recover his retirement benefits, the employment contract provided a means 
for Lifetouch to rescind thirty years of funds Capistrant relied on.145 These 
facts indicate a disproportionate forfeiture under Minnesota case law 
because the three-month delay in returning the property at issue did not 
cause the harm that Lifetouch contractually protected itself against.146 In 
turn, the court should have affirmed the appellate court’s decision. 
2. Adequate Protection 
The Minnesota Supreme Court also denies issuing forfeitures when 
a contract protects the obligor by means other than by forfeiture.147 Here, 
Lifetouch was adequately protected by other provisions in the noncompete 
agreement,148 so a forfeiture should not have been issued because contracts 
are construed to avoid forfeiture unless the parties explicitly intended 
                                                           
139 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l School Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 
3197527, at *2 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016). 
140 See Brief & Addendum of Appellant John J. Capistrant at 19–20, Capistrant v. Lifetouch 
Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (No. A16-1829), 2017 WL 
2131976, at *19–20 [hereinafter Brief & Addendum of Appellant Capistrant]. 
141 See id. at *31. 
142 See id. at *19–20. 
143 See id. at *20. 
144 See id. (noting that forensic services costed Lifetouch $23,441.61—an unnecessary expense, 
considering the lack of evidence against Capistrant). 
145 See id. at *55. 
146 See Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1979). 
147 See Hideaway, Inc. v. Gambit Investments, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (citing Myhre v. Severson, 211 Minn. 189, 191, 300 N.W. 605, 606 (1941)); see also 
Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 263 Minn. 135, 147–48, 116 N.W.2d 91, 100 (1962). 
148 See Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 844, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2017). 
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otherwise.149 Despite the district court’s determination, the contract explicitly 
intended to forfeit Capistrant’s funds. The remedial verbiage noted in two 
unnumbered paragraphs at the end of Paragraph 11 did not solidify 
Lifetouch’s ability to forfeit Capistrant’s Residual Commission: 
In the event that Territory Manager shall violate any of the 
provisions of this section, then Lifetouch shall have the 
right to seek injunctive relief and any other remedy allowed 
to it in law or equity or by this agreement. 
At the end of the Term, Territory Manager shall 
immediately deliver to Lifetouch all of Lifetouch’s 
property . . . in Territory Manager’s possession or control 
and belonging to Lifetouch.150 
As demonstrated, injunctive relief (or other remedies 
sought) protected Lifetouch if Capistrant violated any of “the 
provisions of this section.”151 As assessed, Capistrant did not violate 
any of the terms warranting injunctive or other relief.152 Relying on 
Hideaway,153 the appellate court accurately determined the contract 
protected Lifetouch because violating provisions A, B, or C 
triggered injunctive relief, forfeiture of Capistrant’s Residual 
Commission, and/or any other remedy allowed to Lifetouch.154 
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have affirmed the 
appellate court’s decision because the employment contract 
sufficiently protected Lifetouch without the forfeiture clause, and 
Minnesota’s precedent averts forfeiture actions when other 
provisions protect an obligor.155 
                                                           
149 Id. at 854 (citing Naftalin, 263 Minn. at 147–48, 116 N.W.2d at 100); see Hideaway, 386 
N.W.2d at 824. 
150 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, 
at *2 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016) (emphasis added). 
151 Id. Based on the format of the Agreement, “this section” refers to disclosing trade secrets, 
soliciting or dealing with any schools involved with Lifetouch, and soliciting any present or 
future Lifetouch employees. See Trollen, 287 N.W.2d at 648 (“[I]n cases of mere neglect in 
fulfilling a condition precedent . . . which do not fall within accident or mistake, equity will 
relieve when the delay has been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to grant 
relief would result in such hardship . . . as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the 
condition precedent . . . .”). 
152 See supra Section IV.A.1. 
153 386 N.W.2d at 824. This case involves a property buyer who retained a $13,000 business 
despite only paying the seller $500 after the seller trespassed on the property. Id. at 824–25. 
The Court reversed this determination because the contract’s language was void of any 
language warranting this transfer upon the seller’s trespass. Id. Likewise, this was considered 
unjust because a disproportionate forfeiture would have resulted for the seller while the buyer 
was adequately protected by other means. Id. at 825. 
154 Capistrant, 899 N.W.2d at 857. 
155 See Trollen, 287 N.W.2d at 648 (“[I]n cases of mere neglect in fulfilling a condition 
precedent . . . which do not fall within accident or mistake, equity will relieve when the delay 
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3. Clear & Unmistakable Proof of Intent to Forfeit 
Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court interprets 
contracts without regard to forfeiture provisions because Minnesota 
does not favor them; however, the court will consider them if the 
parties explicitly intend to provide for a forfeiture.156 Here, 
Lifetouch’s intent is outlined in Section III: Residual Commission 
and Payments for Restriction Against Competition.157 It follows 
Paragraph 11. Discerning in pertinent part, it reads: 
If Territory Manager has duly performed all of Territory 
Manager’s obligations under the Agreement and under any 
prior Territory Manager Employment Agreement between 
the parties for a period of at least 6 Fiscal Years prior to the 
end of the Term, following the end of the Term, Lifetouch 
shall pay to Territory Manager a Residual Commission 
equal to 30% of Net Sales Receipts in the Territory during 
the last Fiscal Year before the end of the Term . . . 
Territory Manager’s Residual Commission shall be paid in 
6 equal annual installments, commencing one year from 
the date of termination of the Agreement . . . . 
In consideration for payments of Residual Commission to 
Territory Manager, Territory Manager agrees that the 
provisions of Paragraph 11 of the Agreement shall be 
extended and shall apply during the period Territory 
Manager is entitled to receive Residual Commission 
payments. If at any time Territory Manager breaches the 
provisions of Paragraph 11 of the Agreement, in addition 
to Lifetouch’s other remedies, Lifetouch shall be entitled 
to terminate Lifetouch’s obligation to make any payment 
of Residual Commission that have not yet been paid by 
                                                           
has been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to grant relief would result in such 
hardship . . . as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the condition precedent . . . 
.”); see also Hideaway, 386 N.W.2d at 824.  
156 Compare Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 263 Minn. 135, 147–48, 116 N.W.2d 91, 100 (1962) 
(“Whenever reasonably possible, a construction against a forfeiture will be adopted. To this 
end, a contract will be construed not to provide for a forfeiture unless there is a clear 
expression or manifestation of the intent of the parties in this respect; and, where the contract 
does so provide, the provision will be strictly construed.”) (emphasis added), and id. at 148 
(“One claiming forfeiture carries a heavy burden of establishing his right thereto by clear and 
unmistakable proof.”), with Harris v. Bolin, 310 Minn. 391, 393, 247 N.W.2d 600, 602 
(1976) (“[F]orfeitures under covenants against competition are not favored and those 
claiming them must show that the equities are on their side.”). 
157 See supra Part III. 
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giving Territory Manager written notice of such 
termination.158 
The district court utilized Section III and the second unnumbered 
section in Paragraph 11 as a basis to forfeit Capistrant’s retirement funds, 
arguing that Lifetouch clearly intended this forfeiture and Capistrant 
accepted it as evinced by his signature.159 As such, because Capistrant signed 
the employment agreement and sought his retirement funds, he “should 
have been aware of the provisions of the agreement at issue.”160 Most 
notably, the district court states that “[e]quity cannot rescue Plaintiff from 
his contractual obligations.”161  
The appellate court rightfully rejected this argument based on 
Lifetouch’s inability to provide “clear and unmistakable proof” of 
Lifetouch’s intent to forfeit.162 As noted in Section III, the contract required 
Capistrant to perform all obligations under the Agreement for six years 
before the end of the contract;163 Paragraph 11 enumerated those 
obligations.164 However, the immediate return-of-property clause noted 
within the noncompete provisions is listed after the forfeiture clause, which 
is roped into the period when Capistrant was entitled to receive his Residual 
Commission.165 Meanwhile, the language in Section III requires Capistrant 
to perform his obligations for six years prior to the end of his employment, 
during which he would be receiving his retirement funds.166 Thus, the 
appellate court associates the ongoing obligations listed in clauses A through 
C under Paragraph 11 with the forfeiture clause in Section III.167 The 
appellate court concluded Capistrant could not comply with a return-of-
property clause for the prior six years or for the six years when he was 
                                                           
158 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, 
at *3 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016). 
159 See id. 
160 Id. at *7. 
161 Compare id., with id. at n.5 (“Plaintiff argues that there is no evidence that he used, or 
intended to use, Defendant's property for personal gain. Accordingly, the argument goes, 
there is no harm to Defendant. Although the Court is not unmindful of the drastic 
consequences of what may be oversight rather than villainy, Plaintiff's equitable argument 
fails in the face of the specific contract language.”). 
162 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 844, 854 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2017) (referencing the standard of proof under Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 263 Minn. 135, 
147–48, 116 N.W.2d 91, 100 (1962)). 
163 See Capistrant, 2016 WL 3197527, at *3. 
164 See Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1979). (A) disclosing trade 
secrets; (B) soliciting schools contracted with Lifetouch; or (C) soliciting Lifetouch 
employees. Id. 
165 Compare id., and Capistrant, 899 N.W.2d at 856, with Capistrant, 2016 WL 3197527, at 
*3. 
166 See Capistrant, 2016 WL 3197527, at *3. 
167 Capistrant, 899 N.W.2d at 855. 
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expected to receive his residual commission because returning property is a 
one-time-event.168 Meaning, Lifetouch failed to present clear and 
unmistakable proof that it intended to forfeit Capistrant’s retirement funds 
via the court’s own reasonable interpretation. Thus, based on Minnesota 
precedent,169 the Minnesota Supreme Court should have affirmed this 
determination as a matter of law. 
4. Immateriality of Condition Precedent 
Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court may overrule forfeitures in 
circumstances whereby the violation of an express condition does not 
constitute a material breach.170 Here, the forfeiture clause in Section III 
allowed Lifetouch to terminate its obligation to pay Capistrant’s retirement 
funds if Capistrant “breach[ed]” Paragraph 11.171 Applying BOB Acres, the 
appellate court determined that “[t]he use of the word ‘breach’ does not 
evince an intent of the parties to form a strict forfeiture clause, because even 
when express conditions of a contract are violated, the breach is not 
necessarily material.”172 Instead, a material breach must occur before non-
performance is waived.173 
Under this strict contractual interpretation, a material breach is 
necessary to violate Paragraph 11, not a failure to fulfill the return-of-
property clause condition precedent.174 Lifetouch did not offer any evidence 
or persuasive argument175 to support the conclusion that the immediate 
return of Lifetouch’s property was material, especially because Capistrant 
would not receive his first Residual Commission payment until one year 
after his retirement.176 Moreover, the district court made no finding that 
                                                           
168 Id. 
169 See Chambers v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 64 Minn. 495, 498, 67 N.W. 367, 368 (1896). 
170 See BOB Acres, LLC v. Schumacher Farms, LLC, 797 N.W.2d 723, 728–29 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2011) (referencing Boatwright Constr., Inc. v. Kemrich Knolls, 306 Minn. 519, 520–
21, 238 N.W.2d 606, 607 (1976)). 
171 Capistrant, 899 N.W.2d at 855. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. (citing Heyn v. Braun, 239 Minn. 496, 501, 59 N.W.2d 326, 330 (1953). 
174 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 31 (Minn. 2018). 
175 Lifetouch cites St. Louis Produce Market v. Hughes, 735 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2013) in its 
argument at the district court level. Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-
CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, at *6 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016). While Hughes also 
involves a condition precedent that arose at the end of the parties’ employment relationship, 
Hughes applies Missouri law and does not address the key issue at hand. See Capistrant, 916 
N.W.2d at 30. As noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in reference to its Capistrant 
opinion, “the case is not helpful here” because the return-of-property clause was a “one-time 
event” that Lifetouch relied on to forfeit Capistrant’s entire residual commission that would 
have been paid following Capistrant’s employment. Id. However, the return-of-property 
clause in Hughes was closely tied to the company’s performance. Id. 
176 See Brief & Addendum of Appellant Capistrant, supra note 140, at *31–32. 
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“time was of the essence”177 or material to the agreed-upon exchange.178 The 
court only found that the immediate return-of-property clause was a 
condition precedent.179 Therefore, the unfulfilled condition precedent was 
immaterial to the contract,180 and the forfeiture should not have been issued 
per Minnesota case law.181 
In summary, a forfeiture is disproportionate under Minnesota case 
law if: (1) there is excusable delay fulfilling the condition precedent because 
the delay does not cause the obligor harm; (2) the other provisions in the 
noncompete agreement adequately protected the obligor; (3) the contract’s 
language does not provide clear and unmistakable proof of the obligor’s 
intent to forfeit; or (4) an unfulfilled condition precedent is immaterial to 
the contract.182 Thus, consistent with Minnesota’s aversion to forfeitures, 
Capistrant’s Residual Commission should not have been subject to 
forfeiture. Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have utilized the 
facts on the record in combination with the appellate court’s analysis to 
affirm in Capistrant’s favor. 
B. Alternatively, enforcing the drafting considerations for restrictive 
covenants not to compete under the Bennett test could have secured 
Capistrant his retirement funds. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered whether Capistrant 
could recover if the forfeiture clause within the employment contract 
functioned as a restrictive covenant not to compete in violation of the 
Bennett test.183 Applying Harris by example, the appellate court reasoned 
that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable because the forfeiture 
clause allowed complete forfeiture on the basis of “de minimis harm to 
Lifetouch” even though Lifetouch was “adequately protected under other 
provisions in the contract.”184 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this 
                                                           
177 See Beeler v. Katz Enterprises (Minnesota), Inc., No. C9-00-1684, 2001 WL 410342, at 
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2001) (informing that a breach can be established if time is a 
material element of the contract). 
178 Capistrant, 2016 WL 3197527, at *2. 
179 Id. at *7. 
180 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 844, 856–57 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2017). When addressing this materiality analysis and relevant case law, the appellate court 
applies Restatement Section 229, noting that its application, while not adopted by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, was used in an Eighth Circuit opinion and is persuasive here. Id. 
at n.5. 
181 See BOB Acres, LLC v. Schumacher Farms, LLC, 797 N.W.2d 723, 728–29 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2011) (referencing Boatwright Constr., Inc. v. Kemrich Knolls, 306 Minn. 519, 520–
21, 238 N.W.2d 606, 607 (1976)). 
182 See Capistrant, 899 N.W.2d at 857. 
183 See id. at 858–59. 
184 Id. 
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determination and distinguished Harris from Capistrant.185 The court held 
that, while Capistrant was prohibited from soliciting Lifetouch’s customers 
or employees during the six years he would be receiving his Residual 
Commission, Capistrant’s Agreement was limited in duration and did not 
restrict his ability to work elsewhere or for a competitor.186 Thus, based on 
Harris, the court did not consider the Agreement overbroad.187 However, 
both courts failed to appropriately apply the Bennett test because they solely 
considered Harris, thereby construing the Bennett test as a five-part 
conjunctive rule as opposed to a two-part conjunctive rule with three 
considerations. 
The test applied is whether or not the restraint is necessary 
for the protection of the business or good will of the 
employer, and if so, whether the stipulation has imposed 
upon the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably 
necessary to protect the employer’s business, regard being 
had to the nature and character of the employment, the 
time for which the restriction is imposed, and the territorial 
extent of the locality to which the prohibition extends.188 
As noted above, a noncompete agreement, pursuant to the Bennett 
test, is enforced only when the restraint is necessary to protect the 
employer’s business or good will, and the agreement does not impose a 
greater restraint than reasonably necessary on the employee to protect the 
employer’s business.189 The second half of the rule is not contingent on the 
remaining factors but merely looks to those factors in considering (a) the 
nature and character of the employment; (b) the duration of the 
noncompete; and (c) the geographical scope of the noncompete.190 
Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Capistrant, the 
noncompete provision imposed greater restraint on Capistrant than 
reasonably necessary to protect Lifetouch’s business interests.191 Likewise, 
Minnesota courts also consider the subjective motivation of an employer 
when weighing the relevant Bennett factors, which also weigh in Capistrant’s 
favor.192 
                                                           
185 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 31 n.5 (Minn. 2018). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 270 Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (1965) (emphasis 
added). 
189 Mick & Markison, supra note 41, at 2–3. 
190 Id. (summarizing the remainder of the Bennett test). 
191 See id.; see also Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 844, 858–59 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
192 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Ins. Servs. USA, Inc. v. Kyle King & Sherman Ins. Agency, Inc., 
No. 15-CV-4378, 2016 WL 6892108, at *1 (D. Minn. July 29, 2016); see also infra Section 
IV.B.3. 
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1. Protection of the Business or Good Will of the Employer 
Lifetouch satisfies the first part of the Bennett test. As an extension 
of the first element, courts enforce restrictive covenants to the extent 
necessary to protect “legitimate business interests.”193 Legitimate business 
interests include a company’s good will, trade secrets, and confidential 
information.194 As stated in Lifetouch’s noncompete provision in Paragraph 
11 subsection A, Capistrant was prohibited from disseminating Lifetouch’s 
trade secrets and confidential information.195 This would also include the 
immediate return-of-property clause noted in the second unnumbered 
section in Paragraph 11 because it relates to subsection A. Likewise, it is 
undisputed that the information Capistrant retained would be valuable to 
Lifetouch’s competitors and cause significant harm if disclosed.196 Assuming 
that subparts B and C fall under this same reasoning, the court should have 
considered the first element met and continued to the second part of the 
Bennett test. 
2. No Greater Restraint than Reasonably Necessary 
Lifetouch does not satisfy the Bennett test’s second element 
because it restrained Capistrant more than reasonably necessary. 
Furthermore, each court failed to consider how the noncompete provision, 
as a whole, restrained trade more than reasonably necessary. Like Bennett, 
Lifetouch crafted a noncompete clause that limited Capistrant’s right to 
work and earn a living, 197 given the nature and character of employment, 
duration of the noncompete, and the noncompete’s geographic scope. 
a. Nature & Character of Employment 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that former employees forfeit 
their benefits when they directly compete with their former employers.198 
Capistrant’s nature and character of employment are distinguished from 
Minnesota precedent. Capistrant is a Territory Manager, meaning he is both 
a photographer and sales representative for specified territories, and privy 
                                                           
193 Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Bionics Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 456 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(citing Webb Publ’g Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)). 
194 Id. (citing Roth v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (D. Minn. 1982)). 
195 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, 
at *2 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016). 
196 See Respondent’s Brief at 30, Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 
844 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (No. A16-1829), 2017 WL 2131975, at *30. 
197 See Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (1965). 
198 See, e.g., Walker Emp. Servs., Inc. v. Pankhurst, 300 Minn. 264, 219 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 
1974); Lapidus v. Lurie LLP, A17-1656, 2018 WL 3014698 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2018). 
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to confidential information.199 Further, Capistrant’s employment ended 
because he retired, not because he chose to work for a competing 
business.200 Also, in consideration of Capistrant’s agreement not to compete 
with Lifetouch, Lifetouch agreed to compensate Capistrant $2.6 million in 
six annual installments.201 As such, Capistrant was expected not to use the 
confidential information he was privy to or else forfeit these funds. 
Capistrant never disclosed Lifetouch’s confidential information.202 There is 
also no evidence Capistrant retained a subsequent job, let alone a job for a 
competing company.203 Thus, these payments should have vested to afford 
Capistrant the ability to earn a living through his retired life without needing 
to seek other employment. 
b. Duration of the Non-Compete 
Minnesota courts consider the duration of noncompetes within this 
analysis and come to various determinations based on the amount of funds 
at stake.204 In comparison, had the Capistrant Agreement required only six-
year compliance not to compete in return for $2.6 million, it would have 
satisfied the duration consideration. However, this court has never opined 
on a noncompete clause contingent on years of prior and post compliance 
that terminates upon a one-time event: the “immediate” return of company 
property. While each court agreed that immediacy is unambiguous,205 the 
court of appeals ruled immediacy was immaterial while the supreme court 
viewed materiality itself as susceptible to conflicting inferences.206 Thus, 
there is no consensus regarding immediacy as it pertains to the duration of 
the noncompete. As demonstrated by this lack of case law and conflicting 
inferences, the duration of the noncompete is too broad to be upheld. 
c. Geographical Scope 
                                                           
199 Capistrant, 2016 WL 3197527, at *1. 
200 See id. at *1, *4. 
201 See id. at *3. 
202 See Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, 899 N.W.2d 844, 850, 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2017). 
203 See id. 
204 See, e.g., Roth v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (D. Minn. 1982); 
Lapidus v. Lurie LLP, No. A17-1656, 2018 WL 3014698, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 
2018). 
205 Compare Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 31 n.2 (Minn. 
2018) (agreeing with the court of appeals that a three-month delay cannot constitute as an 
immediate return of property), with Capistrant, 899 N.W.2d at 851 (“‘Immediately’ is an 
unambiguous term.”). 
206 Capistrant, 916 N.W.2d at 30–31. 
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Historically, Minnesota courts uphold noncompetes when the 
geographical scope is limited to a reasonable mile radius unless such 
restriction requires the former employee to accept a substantial salary 
decrease or move to another community to find work.207 While no 
geographical scope is explicitly stated in the Capistrant Agreement, it implies 
a broad and encompassing restriction. As noted in Paragraph 11 subsection 
B, Capistrant is prohibited from directly or indirectly “soliciting” or “dealing 
with” any school associated with Lifetouch or any of its customers or 
affiliates.208 
Lifetouch has been the professional photography company of 
choice for schools and families for over eighty years.209 While Lifetouch’s 
headquarters are in Eden Prairie, Minnesota, “the enterprise is organized 
around four primary business lines operating . . . across North America.”210 
It is also an affiliate of Shutterfly, Inc.—a leading online photo retailer and 
manufacturer of high-quality personalized products, providing its services in 
North America, Canada, and internationally.211 Due to Lifetouch’s 
expansive reach through its own means and through Shutterfly’s affiliation, 
Capistrant is virtually prevented from exercising his expertise anywhere. 
Furthermore, based on Capistrant’s education and experience, he 
would likely need to accept a substantial salary decrease or move to another 
community to find work, contrary to the Bennett standard.212 For instance, 
in 1980, Capistrant graduated from St. Thomas University with a marketing 
degree.213 Upon graduation, he immediately went to work for Lifetouch as a 
photographer and sales representative in California, spending his entire 
working career (nearly 30 years) at the company.214 He first assumed the San 
                                                           
207 Compare, e.g., Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 270 Minn. 525, 536, 134 N.W.2d 892, 900 
(1965) (finding the noncompete unreasonable because prohibiting the former employee 
from accepting any related employment within a thirty-five-mile radius would result in 
needing to accept a substantial salary decrease or move to another community to find work), 
with Walker Emp. Servs., Inc. v. Pankhurst, 300 Minn. 264, 272–73, 219 N.W.2d 437, 441–
42 (1974) (limiting noncompetition to Hennepin County was enforceable), and Lapidus, 
2018 WL 3014698, at *7 (holding that fifty miles is a reasonable geographical limitation to 
not compete). 
208 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, 
at *2 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016). 
209 Who we are, LIFETOUCH (2018), https://lifetouch.com/professional-photography-
company/ [https://perma.cc/MMP5-NGEH]. 
210 Id. 
211 See id.; see also Shutterfly Inc. Closes Transformational Acquisition of Lifetouch, 
SHUTTERFLY INC.: PRESS RELEASES (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.shutterflyinc.com/shutterfly-inc-closes-transformational-acquisition-of-lifetouch/ 
[https://perma.cc/KF3W-ST5C] (acquiring Lifetouch in January 2018). 
212 See Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 899. 
213 See Brief & Addendum of Appellant Capistrant, supra note 140, at *3. 
214 Id. at *3–4. 
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Francisco Bay Territory (“SF Territory”) and many others throughout his 
employment.215 Notably, Capistrant transformed the SF Territory into one 
of the top performing territories in the entire nation. He won “Territory of 
the Year” awards on several occasions, including in 2001 when he “was the 
highest-ranked territory manager company-wide, and one of only two 
territory managers who delivered more than 15% growth and market share 
in his territory.”216 Under Paragraph 11 subsection B, Capistrant cannot 
exercise this level of expertise where he resides.217 Meaning, Capistrant 
would likely need to move residences or assume a substantial salary 
decrease to work in a field he is not familiar with due to Lifetouch’s 
noncompete clause. Thus, this noncompete clause is geographically broad 
and must be struck down under the Bennett test. 
3. Employer’s Subjective Motivations 
Moreover, when applying the Bennett test, Minnesota does not 
enforce noncompete clauses on the subjective motivation of the employer.218 
Based on Capistrant’s procedural posture, Lifetouch attempted to construe 
its immediate return-of-property clause as a final effort to rescind 
Capistrant’s retirement funds, thereby accomplishing its subjective 
motivation to forfeit because of Capistrant’s conduct while employed. For 
instance, Capistrant initially filed a declaratory judgment action against 
Lifetouch to collect his contractually promised Residual Commission.219 
Lifetouch’s Answer and Counter Claim generally denied Capistrant’s 
allegations and countered that any territories assigned to Capistrant via 
Lifetouch’s efforts were not subject to Residual Commission and that 
Capistrant communicated with prohibited parties when employed.220 
However, during the discovery process, Lifetouch amended its Counter 
                                                           
215 Id. at *4 (SF Territory); id. at *9 (remaining territories: CB Territory, KP Territory, Jake 
Barker's Portrait World, W.C. Thompson, and Arabesque). 
216 Id. at *4. 
217 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, 
at *2 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016). 
218 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Ins. Servs. USA, Inc. v. Kyle King & Sherman Ins. Agency, Inc., 
No. 15-CV-4378, 2016 WL 6892108, at *1 (D. Minn. July 29, 2016). 
219 Complaint at 1, Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 
WL 3197527 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016) (27-CV-14-17918), 2014 WL 12784904, at *1. 
Per the Territory Manager Agreement, Section III: “Lifetouch shall pay to Territory 
Manager a Residual Commission equal to 30% of the Net Sales Receipts in the Territory 
during the last fiscal year before the end of the term . . . .” Id. at ¶ 9 (emphasis added). 
However, Lifetouch agreed to pay Capistrant commission including territories that were 
assigned to Capistrant at the start of his employment. Id. at ¶ 13 (emphasis in the original). 
220 Defendant’s Answer & Amended Counterclaim, Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, 
Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016) (No. 27-CV-
14-17918), 2015 WL 13670157. 
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Claim and moved to forfeit Capistrant’s entire Residual Commission upon 
Capistrant’s failure to return Lifetouch’s property immediately.221 This 
indicates Lifetouch’s subjective motivations, which the court should have 
considered further when weighing appropriate restraints. 
In summary, had the court enforced the Bennett test’s drafting 
considerations for restrictive covenants not to compete, Capistrant could 
have secured his retirement funds. While this analysis concedes that 
Lifetouch’s general restraint on disclosing confidential information is 
necessary, the Agreement imposes greater restraints than reasonably 
necessary as detailed under the relevant considerations. First, the nature and 
scope of Capistrant’s employment agreement, while not overtly broad, was 
unnecessary because Capistrant (1) did not compete or intend to compete 
with Lifetouch, and (2) Capistrant was retiring, not terminating his 
employment with the intention to work for another employer. Second, the 
duration of the noncompete was inherently broad because it was contingent 
on an immediate return-of property clause subject to conflicting inferences, 
meaning that a set timeframe could not be established. Thirdly, the 
geographical scope of the noncompete was overly broad because Capistrant 
would likely need to move residences or assume a substantial salary 
decrease in a field he is not as familiar with per Paragraph 11 subsection B. 
Finally, when considering the procedural posture of the Capistrant matter, 
there appears to be subjective motivation on Lifetouch’s part to forfeit 
Capistrant’s retirement funds. As such, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
could have utilized the Bennett test to secure Capistrant’s Residual 
Commission, irrespective of the Restatement. 
C. Section 229 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts creates an 
avenue for corporate employees to retain post-employment benefits in 
future forfeiture actions. 
As demonstrated, the Capistrant matter could have been resolved 
irrespective of Restatement Section 229.222 However, the district court 
abandoned Minnesota’s precedential reluctance toward forfeitures.223 
Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s 
holding, finding that the Restatement could not excuse Capistrant’s failure 
                                                           
221 See id. at ¶ 58, ¶ 62. 
222 See supra Sections IV.A–B. 
223 See Brief & Addendum of Appellant Capistrant, supra note 140, at *37–38 (referencing 
secondary case law that the district court utilized in place of Minnesota case law); see also, 
e.g., St. Louis Produce Mkt. v. Hughes, 735 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying Missouri 
law); AIG Centennial Ins. Co. v. Fraley-Landers, 450 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2006) (arguing for 
compliance with Arkansas law). 
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to comply with the condition precedent as a matter of law.224 Thus, to 
appease both precedent and procedural validity, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted Restatement Section 229 to prevent disproportionate 
forfeitures here and in future actions.225 
The court applied the Restatement to the Capistrant matter as 
follows: “[I]f the occurrence of the condition is a material part of the 
agreement, then the proportionately analysis is not applied, and the 
forfeiture cannot be prevented. But if the condition is not material, then the 
court is to engage in the proportionality analysis.”226 Thus, the primary issue 
on appeal is the materiality of the immediate return-of-property clause 
because the proportionality analysis is already in Capistrant’s favor.227 
Moreover, by adopting the Restatement, enXco Development 
Corp. v. Northern States Power Co. becomes especially persuasive.228 This 
case narrows Restatement Section 229 by assessing circumstances whereby 
the non-occurrence of a condition precedent may result in forfeiture. As 
such, forfeitures may be contingent on: (1) whether the breaching party 
                                                           
224 Compare Crossroads Church v. Cnty. of Dakota, 800 N.W.2d 608, 615 (Minn. 2011) 
(affirming summary judgment because the condition precedent—meeting the statutory 
deadline—was unfulfilled when the contract ended), with Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. 
Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 30–31 (Minn. 2018) (reversing summary judgment because 
the condition precedent imposed ongoing obligations even after the contract ended). 
225 See Capistrant, 916 N.W.2d at 29. “If the district court determines that the immediate 
return of property under the contract was not material, the district court then must turn to 
the proportionality prong of section 229 to determine if the fioriture was disproportionate.” 
Id. However, note that the Supreme Court is only applying this standard to employment 
contracts resulting in disproportionate forfeiture, not for all purposes. Id. at 28 n.3. 
226 See id. at 29 (summarizing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmts. a–c (AM. 
L. INST. 1981)); Varel v. Banc One Capital Partners, Inc., 55 F.3d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(“[D]iscussing how courts applying the Restatement must examine ‘whether performing the 
condition precedent was the object of the contract or merely incidental to it’ and then weigh 
whether the penalty is extreme when ‘measured against the purpose’ of the condition.”); see 
also Brent A. Olson, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK, 
FORMATION AND OPERATIONS OF BUSINESS § 7:110 (Nov. 2020 ed.) (citing the adopted 
Restatement in Minnesota). 
227 See Capistrant, 916 N.W.2d at 31 (reversing the proportionality prong of the appellate 
court’s decision because the court remanded the materiality issue and “the proportionality 
prong is reached only after there is a conclusion on the materiality prong.”). But see 
Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 899 N.W.2d 844, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) 
(reaching the proportionality prong because Capistrant is forfeiting $2.6 million in Residual 
Commission when Lifetouch is protected under Paragraph 11, Clause A, with or without the 
immediate return-of-property clause). See also supra Section IV.A.4 (analyzing the 
immateriality of the condition precedent). 
228 enXco Dev. Corp. v. Northern States Power Co., 785 F.3d 940, 946 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(“Assuming, without deciding, that Minnesota courts would apply the doctrine of 
disproportionate forfeiture to the non-occurrence of conditions precedent . . . .”); Capistrant, 
889 N.W.2d at 860 n.5 (discussing the persuasive nature of the enXco decision). 
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maintains ownership of the assets comprising the contract;229 or (2) whether 
sophisticated parties are represented by counsel during contract 
negotiations.230 
Here, Capistrant failed to fulfill the condition precedent: the 
immediate return-of-property clause.231 Nevertheless, “[a] court need not 
excuse entirely the non-occurrence of the condition, but may merely excuse 
its non-occurrence during the period of time in which it would otherwise 
have to occur . . . if it concludes that the time of its occurrence is not a 
material part of the agreed exchange.”232 Illustrating this comment, 
Capistrant lacked the intent to disseminate the property at issue by 
immediately returning it upon Lifetouch’s request.233 Thus, “immediacy” 
was not material to the Agreement, so Capistrant did not maintain that 
property under the first enXco standard.234 Instead, Lifetouch retained all 
the Residual Commission Capistrant would have assumed.235 Conceding 
that Capistrant’s duties and Residual Commission are material to the 
Agreement,236 Lifetouch maintained ownership of all assets comprising the 
contract by forfeiting Capistrant’s Residual Commission.237 Next, Lifetouch 
is a sophisticated entity whose corporate counsel drafted the Agreement.238 
Meanwhile, Capistrant did not have representation in 1986 when he signed 
the Agreement, so forfeiture must be excused under the second enXco 
standard.239 
                                                           
229 enXco Dev. Corp., 785 F.3d at 947 (emphasizing Klipsch, Inc. v. WWR Tech., Inc., 127 
F.3d 729, 738 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
230 Id. (referencing Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 118, 
125 (Minn. 1991)). 
231 Capistrant, 916 N.W.2d at 26. 
232 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. c. (AM. L. INST. 1981) (emphasis 
added). 
233 Once Lifetouch learned Capistrant still had company documents, Lifetouch requested 
their return and Capistrant returned everything requested, sincerely believing he did so. See 
Brief & Addendum of Appellant Capistrant, supra note 140, at *17. Thereafter, Lifetouch 
acquired no evidence that Capistrant shared these documents with third parties or 
competitors. Id. at *20.  
234 See enXco Dev. Corp., 785 F.3d at 947. 
235 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., No. 27-CV-14-17918, 2016 WL 3197527, 
at *8 (Dist. Ct. Minn. May 12, 2016) (emphasis added) (entitling Lifetouch to terminate its 
obligation to make any payment of Residual Commission). 
236 See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 196, at *5 (“To reward Capistrant for helping to grow 
Lifetouch's business and to ensure that he helped transition that business when he left, 
Lifetouch also agreed to pay Capistrant a smaller amount of money in the form of a ‘Residual 
Commission.’”). 
237 See Defendant’s Answer and Amended Counterclaim, supra note 220. 
238 See Brief & Addendum of Appellant Capistrant, supra note 140, at *4 (“The 1986 
Agreement was drafted by Lifetouch.”). 
239 See Defendant’s Answer and Amended Counterclaim, supra note 220. 
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Capistrant must succeed under the doctrine of disproportionate 
forfeiture per the enXco standard, constructively adopted via Restatement 
Section 229. In the same token, Capistrant affirms enXco by protecting an 
employee’s ability to maintain commissions from corporate entities absent: 
(1) a material breach that the contract is crafted to protect the employer 
against; or (2) when independent counsel executes initial agreements on 
behalf of each party.240 Overall, both create an avenue for employees to 
recover in future forfeiture actions against their corporate employers. Thus, 
this analysis must concede that the Minnesota Supreme Court reached an 
appropriate resolution in the Capistrant matter because Capistrant and 
those similarly situated are more likely to recover under this implemented 
standard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Capistrant presented the court with an employment contract issue 
of first impression: whether it should enforce an immediate return-of-
property clause functioning as a forfeiture clause in a noncompete 
agreement.241 The court determined it must adopt Restatement Section 229 
to afford employees an adequate remedy when the non-occurrence of an 
immaterial condition precedent noted within an employment contract 
would result in a disproportionate forfeiture.242 In sum, the court could have 
affirmed the appellate court’s holding in favor of Capistrant, given 
Minnesota’s reluctance to forfeitures, irrespective of Restatement Section 
229. However, adopting this Restatement creates an avenue for employees 
to retain an appropriate remedy in future forfeiture actions against their 
former corporate employers. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling 
is beneficial to Capistrant and the working community at large, despite there 
not being a sound resolution at bar. 
                                                           
240 Compare enXco Dev. Corp. v. Northern States Power Co., 785 F.3d 940, 947 (8th Cir. 
2014), and Klipsch, Inc. v. WWR Tech., Inc., 127 F.3d 729, 737 (8th Cir. 1997), and Metro. 
Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Minn. 1991), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
241 Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc., 916 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Minn. 2018). 
242 Id. at 31. 
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